International Tax and Public Finance
Framed norms: the effect of choice and belief information on tax compliance
Abstract
This paper examines how different framings of information about social norms affect tax compliance. We test how people respond to information about what others do and what others believe should be done. In a laboratory experiment with voluntary income reporting, participants received messages describing honest or dishonest behavior, or approval or disapproval of tax evasion. The results show that the effects of these messages depend heavily on how they are framed. A permissive message suggesting that tax evasion can sometimes be acceptable was associated with more evasion. Even a seemingly positive message stating that most people reported their income honestly appeared to backfire, although this result was less consistent. The other messages had little effect. For tax authorities, social-norm messages should not be treated as a simple, low-risk way to improve compliance. Their content and likely interpretation should be tested carefully before implementation, as messages that inadvertently legitimize non-compliance may weaken rather than strengthen tax compliance.